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TOP SECRET -- EYES ONLY

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

October 27, 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary

FROM: DNR - Roger Hillsman *R. Hillsman*

SUBJECT: Moscow Ups the Ante in Cuba Negotiations

CATEGORY "A"
 Completely de-sensitized
 Transferred to O/FADRO
 By *SSS* Date *8-2-83*

We seek in this memorandum to update the estimate in our memorandum of early this morning in light of today's public letter from Khrushchev, proposing a trade-off of missiles in Turkey for missiles in Cuba.

After privately offering what seemed on the face of it a surprisingly cheap bargain for the withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba yesterday, Moscow today publicly insists that the US must also withdraw "its" missiles from Turkey. In making the proposal, Khrushchev in effect admits for the first time publicly that Soviet missiles are in Cuba, though he attributes the characterization "offensive" to the US. Indeed, Khrushchev for the first time explicitly indicated that the missiles based in Cuba were part of the Soviet Union's own strategic striking force.

A number of pitfalls are immediately apparent in the Khrushchev proposal:

- 1) The Soviets probably calculated that a mere mention of the possibility of negotiations would disturb US-Turkish relations as well as the NATO alliance.
- 2) The reference to Britain and Italy suggest that at some point in the talks, the USSR might attempt to raise the ante again and propose inclusion of other countries in the arrangement.
- 3) The proposal is ambiguous concerning the time limit, and the period mentioned apparently concerns the end of the negotiations and not the length of time for dismantling the bases.
- 4) The inspection proposal, although forthcoming on the face of it, opens up the usual questions concerning terms of reference and veto power.
- 5) The assurances to Cuba raise the same problems as the previous letter with regard to the legitimacy of the Castro regime and US relations with Cuban exiles.

In terms of Soviet objectives in this negotiation, this latest development strengthens the estimate that the USSR is seeking to gain time for its missiles in Cuba to attain operational effectiveness while fostering a political atmosphere in which forceful US action becomes increasingly difficult. The proposal continues the Soviet effort to make dismantling of the missiles a subject rather than a precondition for negotiations.

TOP SECRET -- EYES ONLY

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